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Abstract
The principal philosophical systems of India are divided into two branches: āstika and nāstika. This division, however, 
is basically religious, not philosophical or logical. Whatever might have been the original meanings of these two terms, 
so far as Indian philosophical literature is concerned, āstika means Veda-abiding and nāstika, non-Veda-abiding. This 
is an instance of the intrusion of Dharmaśāstra into Mokṣaśāstra: the rules of religious law operating on what was 
claimed to be the science of freedom (mokṣa/mukti). Thus, religious law had its position asserted and the materialists 
along with the Jains and the Buddhists were declared to be outside the Vedic fold.
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Dharmasastra vis-à-vis Moksasastra: La posición 
especial del Veda en las filosofías de la India
Resumen
Los principales sistemas filosóficos de la India se dividen en dos ramas: āstika y nāstika. Esta división, sin embargo, es 
básicamente religiosa, no filosófica o lógica. Cualquiera que haya sido el significado original de estos dos términos, en 
lo que respecta a la literatura filosófica india, āstika significa veda y nāstika, no veda. Este es un ejemplo de la intrusión 
de Dharmaśāstra en Mokṣaśāstra: las reglas de la ley religiosa que operan sobre lo que se decía que era la ciencia de la 
libertad (mokṣa / mukti). Así, la ley religiosa tuvo su posición afirmada y los materialistas junto con los jainistas y los 
budistas fueron declarados fuera del redil védico.
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astika and nastika 
The words, āstika and nāstika, and their derivatives and 
cognates are often used for the philosophical systems in 
India. These words do not occur in the Vedic Saṃhitās. 
Nāstikya appears only once in the late Maitrāyanīya 
Upaniṣad (MaiUp) 3.5. Another word, unique in the 
whole of Upaniṣadic literature, is avaidika, ‘non-vedic,’ 
occurring in the same work (7.10). This is the first indica-
tion of a division made between two traditions – Vedic and 
non-/anti-Vedic. The MaiUp (7.8) offers an interesting 
record of what is meant by non-vedic.
Here is a rich field for the study of heresiology from 
the brahmanical point of view. Several heretical doctri-
nes advocated by their followers are mentioned. The list 
includes Buddhism (kaṣāya-kuṇḍalina), śakti-worship 
(kāpālina), cults around popular beliefs in ghosts and 
goblins and other supernatural evil beings (yakṣa-rākṣasa-
bhūta-gaṇa-piśāca, etc.). At the same time, members of 
some professional groups, such as dancers and actors 
(naṭa…raṅgāvatāriṇa), employees engaged in king’s 
business (rājakarmaṇi), that is, government servants (or 
those degraded to royal service), are also included for no 
obvious reasons. N. Tsuji says: ‘Can one find, for instance, 
in any great Upaniṣad such an unreserved attack on false 
doctrines, including most probably Buddhism, as in the 
Maitrāyanīya Upaniṣad 7:8-10?’ (qtd. S. Bhattacharji 
2:180). The list covers all sorts of people who are also 
condemned in the brahmanical Dharmaśāstras. 
A similar list of ‘false views,’ this time from the Budd-
hist point of view, is found in ‘The Sixty-two Kinds of 
Wrong Views,’ in the ‘Perfect Net Sutta,’ Long Discourses 
(‘Brahamajāla Sutta’, Dīgha Nikāya 1.1). Much later, a 
comparable list of nearly fifty sorts of heretics, this time 
from the Jain point of view, is given in Siddharṣi (tenth/
eleventh century CE)’s An Allegorical Tale of the World 
(Upamiti-bhava-prapañcā-kathā , hereafter UBhPK), pp. 
547-48. Only a handful few of the cults survive in their 
old names; most of them perhaps disappeared in the 
course of time or merged with other cults. Their identity, 
or even the literal meaning of some such communities, 
cannot be deciphered with certainty. They do not occur 
anywhere else in the whole of Sanskrit literature. (For 
a survey of these sects see Jacobi’s Introduction to the 
UBhPK, pp.xxvii-xxxv).
In order to combat scepticism, besides having resort 
to verbal testimony (śabda, āptavākya), as the authority 
of Yama is invoked in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (KathUp),1 
the concept of Knowledge (vidyā) was held up in the 
Upaniṣads as something to be sought and attained, which 
would lead to freedom (mukti, mokṣa). 
With a view to establishing the need for freedom, belief 
in the existence of the Other World was necessary; it was 
the pre-condition for the attainment of freedom. This is 
how in the Upaniṣads, Knowledge was to replace Sacrifice, 
the basic plank of the Vedic religion. Thus, nāstika came 
to refer to the disbeliever in the Other World as hinted at 
in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad 1.2.20. The doubting Naciketas 
asks Yama, the Lord of the World of the Dead:
’this constant doubt about a man departed –
Some say he is, and others say he is not –
this do I wish to know of thee (Yama) . . .’ (Roby Datta’s 
trans. 1983 p.21)
The derivation of astika and nāstika was most probably 
from this source. 
astika and nastika in Panini and after
It should be remembered that although Pāṇini refers 
to the origin of the āstika, the nāstika and the daiṣṭika 
(Aṣṭādhyāyī 4.4.60) there is no indication of whose exis-
tence or non-existence he had in mind. Many centuries 
later two Buddhist commentators of the Aṣṭādhyāyī ex-
plained the words in terms of having belief and no belief 
in the Other World. However, as yet there is no indication 
that the belief would be in anyway related to the Veda as 
also the reviler of the Veda (as in Manu 2.11). Moreover, 
whatever be the date of the Aṣṭādhyāyī all the philosophi-
cal systems had certainly not evolved by Pāṇini’s time. It 
is clear from the commentaries and sub-commentaries 
that all the three words derived from asti, nāsti, diṣṭa 
refer to individuals holding such views, rather than the 
philosophical systems subscribing to them. Most of the 
references concerning nāstikas in the Dharmaśāstras, too, 
refer to persons rather than any philosophical systems. 
The occurrence of these words in the Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa 
vulgate 2. 109 should not detain us, for the passages that 
contains them have  been proved to be later additions (see 
crit. ed. Additional Passage  2241* lines 21-26 and 
2241 (B)* and R. Bhattacharya 2016b pp.185-204 for 
further details). 
All this shows that both āstika and nāstika originally 
belonged exclusively to the domain of Dharmaśāstra. 
Over time they were made to intrude in a different do-
main, not at all related to Dharmaśāstra. From the time 
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darśana was declared to be Mokṣaśāstra, a neat one-to-one 
correspondence between the four aim(varga)s of life and 
the four śāstras has been worked out. Each śāstra claimed 
to be the supreme one in so far as it involved the most 
important aim of life. 
This was not the case when Vātsyāyana’s Kāmasūtra 
was redacted. He knew of only three vargas (1.2.51). So 
the equation between darśana and Mokṣaśāstra must have 
been made some time after the 400 CE. Thus darśana, 
originally a secular discipline, became an instrument of 
achieving freedom, a concept related to theology, not 
philosophy.
The idea of freedom, however, differs from one philo-
sophical system to another. Vedānta, for example, would 
not care to accept the state of freedom acknowledged by 
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. One devout Vaiṣṇava is said to have 
declared: ‘I would rather move in beautiful Vṛndāvana as a 
jackal but will never pray for the freedom of the Vaiśeṣikas’ 
(varaṃ vṛndāvane ramye śṛgālatvaṃ vrajamyaham/ na tu 
vaiśeṣikīṃ muktiṃ prārthayāmi kadācana. Qtd. Tarkava-
gisa 1978 p.7). The concept of heaven in the Mīmāṃsā 
system has nothing in common with that of any other. 
It is heaven rather than freedom that the Mīmāṃsakas 
cherished. 
Gradually in the philosophical literature, too, nāstika 
came to mean primarily the reviler of the Veda, an idea 
that had originated with the religious law-makers. It was 
taken over by the Veda-abiding philosophers as well. 
Dharmaśāstra thus came to assail Mokṣaśāstra, a name 
given to darśana as a whole (of course the pro-Vedic 
systems only). What is often forgotten is that the second 
meaning of āstika did not affect the Jains and the Budd-
hists. Even though, along with the materialists, they were 
branded nāstikas by the Vedists, Jain and Buddhist philo-
sophers continued to use the two words in the old sense: 
so much so that, even as late as in the eighth century ce 
Haribhadra declares the Jain and the Buddhist systems as 
āstikavādins (Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya verse 78d) along with 
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Jaiminīya (Mīmāṃsa) 
mata(view)s. By nāstika they all meant the materialists 
and the materialists alone (for instance, Śāntarakṣita, 
Tattvasaṅgraha 22.1871: nāstikatā; Hemacandra, 
Anya-yoga-vyaveccheda-dvātriṃśikā  verse 20: nāstika). 
Nāstika-śiromaṇi, the crest jewel of the nāstikas, in Sāyaṇa-
Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha chap.1, however, could 
have been used in either of the senses, disbeliever in the 
Other World and anti-Vedic. 
Objections to the astika/nastika scheme
Several objections have been raised concerning the 
āstika/nāstika division. First, the question of adhering to 
or reviling the Veda goes against etymology. Admittedly 
meanings of words change, the etymology may be forgot-
ten. ‘But instances are perhaps rare where the meaning 
of a word is fixed, in total disregard to etymology, just 
on the whim of an individual’, i.e., Manu (Gangopad-
hyaya 1990 p.16). Second, the division originates from a 
non-philosopher. ‘Manu is after all a law-giver and not a 
philosopher. Unlike the philosopher, the law-giver may 
not be concerned with an essentially rational approach to 
reality. Rather he is interested in the security of a social 
structure which he considers to be the most desirable 
and ideal’ (ibid.). Third, the division is based on the 
scripture of a particular religion, Brahmanism ‘What 
would be the situation if the similar principle is adopted 
for classification by other religions or systems also? If the 
Carvaka-s urged that the only criterion for being astika 
is faith in the Brihaspati-sutra, what would be the fate of 
the other systems?’ (ibid p.17). Fourth, is the veneration 
for the Veda genuine or fake? Instances have been cited 
from the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems that 
‘apparent piety’ has been grafted to philosophical enquiries 
presumably to avoid the censure of the law-givers (ibid 
pp.18-20).
In view of all this, the āstika/nāstika division appears to 
be prompted by considerations other than philosophical.
tarka and heresy
In the brahmanical tradition the role of tarka (argu-
ment) was not denied or discounted, but it was recom-
mended with a proviso: it must not be inconsistent with 
the Vedas and Smṛtis.2 The mention of the latter (śāstra) 
is to be noted well, for it involves not only the world of 
ideas but also the customs to be observed in social life. 
The reason for bracketting all non-vedic doctrines along 
with the outcasts and other condemned social groups in 
the MaiUp is not known. Its commentary by Rāmatīrtha 
is not of any use in this regard. But more interesting is the 
description of the arch-heretic: 
Thus the text says: Erring because of the sophisms, 
false illustrations and the grounds of the doctrine that 
holds there is no atman, the world does not know what 
the conclusion of Vedic wisdom is. (MaiUp 7.8)[van 
Buitinen’s trans.]  
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vṛthā-tarka-dṛṣṭānta-kuhakendrajālair vaidikeṣu 
paristhātum icchanti taiḥ saha nairātmavāda-kuhakair 
mithyā-dṛṣṭānta-hetubhiḥ…na jānāti veda-vidyāntarantu 
yāt.
The word kuhaka used twice is highly significant. 
Apparently, the doctrines of rationalism and infideism 
were already posing a grave threat to the Vedists, for a 
section of the people, whatever might have been their 
number, was being drawn to them and getting convinced 
in the inefficacy of performing what they considered to 
be nonsensical rituals. These doctrines were working like 
magic and getting hold over the mind of the people. The 
list of heretics, a medley of all sorts of social outcasts, 
entertainers, and followers of popular cults (the so-called 
‘Little Tradition’), includes all those heterodox groups 
and heretics whose very existence was a matter of great 
concern to the orthodox Vedists. The opponents of the 
Vedic tradition were generally clubbed together; they were 
called nāstika, pāṣaṇḍa (pākhaṇḍa), haituka (hetuka), etc.; 
in one word, avaidika (as in the MaiUp). (For details see 
Squarchini)   
It is no wonder, therefore, that the Dharmaśāstras 
(Books of Religious Law) consider nāstikya as a lapse 
(pātaka). The Manu-, Yājñavalkya-  and Viṣṇu-Saṃhitās in 
particular, call nāstikya a lapse, albeit minor (upapātaka).3 
While explaining the lapse involved in reviling the Veda 
and forgetting the Veda (along with giving false evidence). 
Manu 11.56 considers all of them as lapses similar to 
drinking intoxicating beverage (surā), which is a major 
lapse. Apparently, an upapātaka can be and presumably 
was treated as a mahāpataka too. 
nastika in Dharmasastra literature
The commentators of the Manu were not sure what 
exactly was meant by nāsti, ‘(it) exists not’. Medhātithi, 
Kullūka, Govindarāja and others offer several explana-
tions: a nāstika, for instance, is a non-believer in the Other 
World, a reviler of the Veda, a denier of the doctrine of 
karman and its effects, etc. (see the glosses on Manu 
11.65 in Dave 6:62-63). The word had already become 
polysemous, related to both theology and philosophy. 
Sometimes the same commentator offers alternative 
meanings while glossing nāstika or any of its derivatives 
(e.g., Govindarāja on Manu 2.11: ‘a firm denier of the 
Other World, [and] a reviler of the Veda,’ nāsti paralokādi 
rityevaṃ stithaprajñaḥ vedanindako). Two commentators, 
Rāghavānanda and Nandana, for reasons best known to 
them, refrained from explaining nāstika in Manu 2.11. 
Yājñavalkya 3.228 too considers reviling the Veda and 
forgetting the Veda after knowing and studying it, as a 
lapse similar to the killing of a brahmana, which, like 
drinking intoxicating beverage, is a major lapse. So, 
nāstikya is treated not so much as one of the forty nine 
minor lapses (anupātakas and upapātakas enumerated 
in Manu 11.60-67). It would be rewarding to follow 
the glosses on nāstika and its cognates in the Smṛti texts 
and the commentaries thereon, if only the works could 
be reliably dated and preferably localized (in which part 
of the Indian sub-continent they were written) with a 
considerable degree of certainty.
Let it be noted in this connection that the commenta-
tors were not overtly interested in philosophy as the text 
too was not. Nevertheless, hetuka in Manu 4.30 is a person 
‘not fit to be honoured’ whereas in 12.111 he is one who 
must be a member of the Pariṣad. In the Yājñavalkya-
smṛti  3.301 a hetuka is one well versed in the principles 
of Mīmāṃsā and the śāstras. To Medhātithi hetuṣāstra 
is nāstika tarkaśāstraṃ bauddha-cārvākādi śāstraṃ (on 
Manu 2.11). It is repeatedly proclaimed in this śāstra 
that the Veda is conducive to demerit (Vedo’dharmāya). 
Medhātithi also explains haituka in Manu 1.129 as ‘one 
who creates doubt everywhere with the strength of reason 
(yuktivalena)’.  
Not all translators of the Manu (Georg Bühler and 
Ganganatha Jha, for instance) paid much attention to 
the several meanings of nāstikya; some of them take it 
to mean ‘atheism’ and nothing else. The fact is that in all 
the old commentaries it is either the denial of the exis-
tence of the Other World (as in Vāmana and Jayāditya’s 
Padamañjarī  and the Nyāsa on the Aṣṭādhyāyī) or that of 
the authority of the Veda (as in Manu 2.11) or both (For a 
fuller discussion see R. Bhattacharya 2009/2011, pp.227-
231). Atheism is a later concept, not much relevant in 
relation to the general picture of lapse and atonement 
so elaborately itemized in the Dharmaśāstras. Only two 
commentators of Manu, Kullūka and Maṇirāma, explain 
nāstikya as denial of the doctrine of karman (glosses on 
Manu 11.65 in Dave 6:62-63).4
Lastly, despite the very widespread notion that Manu 
2.11 provides a definition of the nāstika (Nicholson 2015 
p.168), it is to be observed that nāstiko vedanindakaḥ can 
very well be explained as two different adjectives of the 
twice- born, that is,  he is both a denier (of the Other 
World) as well as a reviler of the Veda. While studying the 
Dharmaśāstras and their commentaries we come along a 
host of words that are conceptually related to one another, 
although not semantically identical in all respects. They are 
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employed in connection with nāstika and its derivatives 
in several Dharmaśāstras.5 
Reading heretical texts asacchāstrādhigamana




Forgetting the Veda after studying it jñeyam-adhītasya-ca nāśana
He who says ‘no’ (to the Other World 
and/or the Veda) 
nāstika
One who earns his livelihood from a 
nāstika
nāstikavṛtti
Denier of the Other World paralokāpavādin
Heretic, heterodox pāṣaṇḍa/pāṣaṇḍin
Forgetting the Vedas brahmojjhatā
Reasoner and/or Materialist lokāyata/lokāyatika
Reviler of the Veda vedanindaka
Relinquishing the study of Veda and 
performance of Vedic rituals. 
svādhyāyāgni-tyāga




Not all commentators explain all these terms in the 
same way. Most probably, they too were not sure what 
exactly the implication of nāstikya was. Sarvajñanārayaṇa, 
for example, explains nāstikavṛttayaḥ as those who 
think there is no effect of karman (nāsti karmaphalam 
ityabhimāninaḥ). However, what emerges from the list and 
the interpretations is a general denunciation of all sorts of 
heretical and heterodox doctrines. Nāstika is an umbrella 
term; one who says ‘no’ to any of the fundamental doctri-
nes of the brahmanical religion (which came to be known 
in later times as Hinduism) is branded as a nāstika. The 
word has more significations in Dharmaśāstra/Smṛti  lite-
rature than in darśana, where it stands for either ‘denier of 
the Other World’ or ‘denier of the authority of the Veda’.
Brhaspati conspicuous by his absence
Strangely enough, the word bārhaspatya, often used in 
philosophical literature as a synonym of nāstika, Cārvāka, 
and lokāyatika (or laukāyatika) (see R. Bhattacharya 2013a 
pp.3-8), is conspicuous by its absence in the Dharmaśāstra/
Smṛti literature. Could it be due to the cause that there 
was a Smṛti work attributed to Bṛhaspati (as there was 
also an Arthaśāstra text attributed to him, for instance, 
in the KA 1.2.4)? Although the text is now lost, enough 
fragments are available to show that the author of the 
Bṛhaspati-smṛti  was as respectful of Manu as expected of 
any Veda-abiding conformist.  The author of this work 
accepts Manu as the highest authority ‘because he has 
embodied the essence of the Veda in his work’ (Aiyen-
gar (ed.) 27.3; see also Jolly p. 387). A reference to the 
Bṛhaspati-nīti (nītiṃ bṛhaspatiproktāṃ) in Mbh 3.33.56-57 
(critical edition) reveals that the moral teachings of this 
Bṛhaspati was believed to be congenial to the royalty, so 
much so that learned brahmaṇas were employed by kings 
like Drupada to teach it to his sons (Mbh 3.33.56-57 crit. 
ed.; vulgate 3.32). This Bṛhaspati-nīti  too has nothing to 
do with materialism. On the other hand, this Bṛhaspati 
believed in the doctrine of karman and God (vidhātā). 
Jacobi observed, not without some humour: ‘The Nīti-
teachings of Bṛhaspati, which Draupadī expounds in 
Mahābhārata III.32 [vulgate], are at any rate as orthodox 
as one can wish!’ (1911/1970 p.737; 1918 p.104). 
This Bṛhaspati was of course not the same Bṛhaspati 
as the preceptor of the gods, who in some of the Purāṇas 
misleads the demon (asura)s by preaching anti-Vedic doc-
trines and thereby helps the gods win back their position 
(for details see R. Bhattacharya 2013c). Evidently there 
were several Bṛhaspatis (see Aiyenger Introduction pp. 
77-84; Dasgupta 3:531-532) and the redactors of and 
commentators on the Smṛtis did not wish to confuse their 
readers by referring to Bṛhaspati while delineating on the 
nāstikas. One single word, nāstika, was made to bear the 
burden of all sorts of heresy and heterodoxy. 
Long before the Cārvākas appeared on the scene 
(c. eighth century ce), there were definitely other ma-
terialists, individuals as well as groups, belonging to 
different schools of materialism, such as Bhūtavāda and 
Lokāyata, as mentioned in the sixth-century Tamil epic 
Maṇimēkalai, chap.27.Or they might have been indivi-
duals, not connected with any materialist  school at all . 
They were normally branded as nāstikas, not only by the 
brahmanical writers but also by the Jains. Saṅghadāsagaṇi 
(sixth/seventh century)’s Vasudevahiṃḍī (The Wanderings 
of Vasudeva) mentions ṇāhiyavādī (p.169), natthiyavāī 
(p.275)  and nāhiyavādī (p.329) to suggest a materialist. 
Haribhadra (eighth century) in his Samarāiccakahā too 
speaks of nāhiyavādī (p.164). Ᾱryaśūra, a Buddhist poet, 
writes of anāstika (=āstika): ‘How should the believer in 
the true and rational doctrine commit a deed, which we 
are sure, neither the denial of causality (ahetuvādī), nor 
the believer in absolute dependence (paratantra-dṛṣṭiḥ) nor 
the non-materialist (anāstikaḥ) . . . would perform for the 
sake of a little glory?’ (23.57, p.215). It is not that such 
names as lokāyatika or bhūtavādin were not current be-
fore the eighth century. They both occur in Maṇimēkalai 
(27.264,273). Much later, in the tenth century, Siddharṣi 
in his UBhPK speaks of a city called Lokāyata in which 
the Bārhaspatyas reside (lokāyataṃ iti proktāṃ puram atra 
tathāparaṃ | bārhaspatyāśca te lokā ye vāstavyāḥ pure’tra 
bhoḥ || (Chapter 4, p. 661). These people are said to be 
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under the influence of false perception (mithyādarśana) 
and wrong views, kudṛṣṭi (cf. Manu 12.95 that also speaks 
of kudṛṣṭayaḥ). 
Guṇaratna (sixteenth century), a Jain scholar, believed 
that all darśanas, whether vedic or non-vedic in essence, 
were inextricably linked to one religious sect or the other.6 
He therefore consistently relates the six/seven systems 
to their corresponding religious sects. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika 
belongs to the devotees of Śiva, Sāṃkhya to those of 
Nārāyaṇa, and Jaiminīya admits no other guru but the 
Veda. He typecasts the first as follows: they carry staffs, 
wear loincloth, have matted locks, their bodies are covered 
with ashes, they display sacred threads, etc. (pp. 49, 266). 
The followers of Sāṃkhya are Parivrājakas (wandering 
mendicants); they carry three staves or one (tridaṇḍā 
ekadaṇḍā vā), wear crimson robes, sit on deer skins, etc. 
(p.95), so do the Jaiminīyas (p.283). Guṇaratna similarly 
relates the Lokāyatikas to the Kāpālikas (p. 300), appa-
rently because, in his view, every system of philosophy 
was associated with a religious sect. As his own religion 
(Jainism) and philosophy were the same, so it was with the 
Buddhists. Guṇaratna’s typecasting might have been true 
in his own times (although that too is doubtful), but it is 
utterly unacceptable for later times. Good Vaiṣṇavas have 
been followers of Nyāya and not all followers of Sāṃkhya 
are necessarily devotees of Nārāyaṇa.
Moreover, Haribhadra’s one-to-one correspondence 
between the deity (devatā) and its principle (tattva), as 
told in verse 2, may not be altogether true. In some cases 
religious sects beget their own philosophical systems; in 
other instances, some other philosophical systems have a 
secular origin, owing nothing to any religious sect. The 
Cārvāka/Lokāyata is a case in point. Nevertheless, the fact 
remains that even Sāṃkhya, the most pronounced atheis-
tic philosophical system (in the modern sense of not ad-
mitting any God or gods) and perhaps the oldest, admits 
śabda (verbal testimony) as a valid instrument of cognition 
(prāmaṇa) and regards the Veda as the Word of Words. 
There is no reference to God in the list of categories in the 
base text of Nyāya, yet right from Vātsyāyana, author of 
the first available commentary on the Nyāyasūtra, down 
to the sub-commentators, all place the Veda on a par with 
perception and inference.7 Thus, even though no God or 
gods/goddesses are necessarily to be obeyed or worshipped 
by the āstika philosophers and their adherents, adherence 
to the Veda is sine qua non for all āstikas.
The only exception to these Veda-abiding systems, 
and such non-vedic yet religious (although atheistic) 
schools are the materialists, who at least from the time of 
the Buddha (sixth/fifth century bce) defied all religious 
bindings and allegiance to the holy texts, and yet deve-
loped a parallel, radical system of philosophy. The base 
text(s) and the commentaries thereon are not available 
as yet – everything seems to have disappeared after the 
twelfth century – but there are just enough fragments to 
bear testimony to their existence. 
The division of the philosophical systems into āstika 
and nāstika in its current commonly cited form is not very 
old. It is not found before the twelfth century. Kṛṣṇamiśra 
in his allegorical play, Prabodha-candrodaya makes use of 
this division. His concept of the nāstika, however, is not 
always modelled on the new meaning, namely, non-Vedic. 
Mahāmoha, the king of evil, accuses ‘the garrulous āstikas’ 
who deceive the fools by saying what does not exist, exists 
and revile ‘the nāstikas who speak the truth’.’ Mahāmoha 
then challenges if anyone has seen the soul different from 
the body (Act 2 verse 17). Here nāstika stands for mate-
rialism and nothing else. Kṛṣṇamiśra includes among the 
nāstikas, besides the philosophical schools, some religious 
communities or sects that he considered to be non-vedic 
(Kāpālikas, for example. Act 2 p.74ff and Act 5 p.126). 
His mention of Patañjali’s  ‘Mahābhāṣya and other śāstras’ 
in the list of philosophical schools (Sāmkhya, Nyāya, 
Kāṇāda and Mīmāṃsā) contending against thenāstikas 
(Act 5 verse 7) is highly intriguing. Kṛṣṇamiśra, however, 
treats the darśanas as allied to the worshippers of five 
cults (pañcopāsanā), such as, the Vaiṣṇavas, Śaivas, Sauras, 
Gāṇapatyas and Śāktas (Act 5 p.124). Insofar as the āstika 
darśanas are derived from the Veda, notwithstanding their 
differences, they can unite to defeat the pāṣaṇḍa agamas, 
that include the Lokāyata, which is opposed to both the 
Vedic and the two non-Vedic systems (parāparapakṣa-
virodhitayā) (Act 5 p.126).
Sāyaṇa-Mādhava in his doxographical work, Sarva-
darśana-saṃgraha, too, it seems, followed the new 
meaning of nāstika, not the old. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 
offers a neat list of six āstika and nāstika systems, each 
having six members. Previously only three systems, 
the Buddhists, the Jains, and materialists constituted 
the nāstikas. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī mentions four 
Buddhist systems of philosophy separately: Śūnyavāda 
(Mādhyamika), Kṣaṇikavāda (Yogācāra), Vāhyārthavāda 
(Sautrāntika) and Pratyakṣa-svalakṣaṇa  (Vaibhāṣika), all 
belonging to the  Saugata (Buddhist). Then he alludes 
to Dehātmavāda (Cārvāka), and finally Dehavyatirikta-
dehapariṇāmātmavāda (Digambara Jain): evaṃ militvā 
nāstikānām ṣaṭprasthānāni (p.3). 
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Cimaṇṇabhaṭṭa too speaks of the same six in a different 
order of arrangement: Cārvāka, Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, 
Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika and Ārhata. His understanding 
of nāstika is that it is non-Vedic (p.89).8 Let it be remem-
bered that this new meaning was not accepted by anyone 
except the Vedists. The Jains and Buddhists continued to 
use the pair of words in the old, original sense as before.
sat-tarki
However, the concept of ṣaṭ-tarkī or ṣaṇmata is found 
much earlier (for further details see Gerschheimer 2007 
passim). Wilhelm Halbfass (1988) does not speak of it, as 
he does not care for the āstika-nāstika division. However, 
this division is of seminal importance. Apart from works 
of logic and poetics, some inscriptions found both in 
India and in abroad refer to ṣaṭ-tarkī. The first reference 
to it occurs in Jayantabhaṭṭa’s NM (Ch.1 p.9).  There 
too we have a distinction made – or at least implied – 
between those systems adhering to the Veda (Sāṃkhya, 
Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika) and those denying its authority (Jain, 
Buddhist, Cārvāka). Even then, the fact remains that long 
before Jayanta (ninth century) the distinction between 
the prevalent philosophical systems were current in south 
India. Maṇimēkalai (± 550 ce) records six systems that 
accept logic, namely Lokāyata, Buddhism, Sāṃkhya, 
Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā (27.77-80). The notable 
absentees, as in many other accounts, are Vedānta, Yoga 
and Jainism. Since Sīthalai Sāttanār, author of the work, 
was a devout Buddhist, we are not to expect any division 
in terms of pro-Vedic and anti-Vedic. The author does 
not even use the words, āstika and nāstika, to signify 
belief and disbelief in the existence of the Other World 
or rebirth. The exponent of Lokāyata however, makes his 
position vis-à-vis rebirth quite clear as does Maṇimēkalai, 
the Buddhist princess (27.74-76). Apparently, the āstika 
-nāstika demarcation came into vogue later, most probably 
in or around the eighth century.
Strangely enough, Haribhadra, in spite of being a 
Jain, uses the term āstikavādinaḥ, ‘those who say it exists’ 
(ṢDSam v.78, p.299) to denote only four pro-Vedic sys-
tems, namely, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā. 
The account of materialism (Lokāyata, also called the view 
of the Cārvākas in verse 85, begins with: ‘At first the own 
form of the nāstika is being said,’ prathamaṃ nāstika-
svarῡpam ucyate (p.300)). In all probability Haribhadra 
took the word nāstika to mean a denier of the Other 
World, not a reviler of the Veda, for the new meaning of 
nāstika would make both Buddhism and Jainism to belong 
to the nāstika category. This is how the Cārvākas right 
from the eighth century earned four designations: cārvāka, 
nāstika, bārhaspatya, and lokāyata. Śaṅkara (ninth century) 
in his gloss on Kaṭha Upaniṣad (KaṭhUp) 2.3.12 speaks 
of the nāstikavādin (he who says (it) does not exist) and 
astitva-vādinaḥ (those who say (it) exists).The distinction 
between the two, however, was not introduced by him. It 
was already current at least a century before. 
Materialism vis-à-vis Dharmasastra
Although no definite date can be suggested when the 
division between the āstika and the nāstika systems was 
first made, it continued to be employed in later times. It 
was in the eighth century when the Cārvāka/Lokāyata 
had been clearly identified as a nāstika system, not only in 
the brahmanical tradition (either in the sense of its anti-
Other World or anti-Vedic credentials, or both) but in 
the Buddhist and Jain traditions as well. Materialism was 
isolated and identified as a system of philosophy, whether 
pre-Cārvāka or Cārvāka, which was to be combated 
and condemned. The moot question is: how could such 
terms as āstika and nāstika, belonging to Dharmaśāstra, 
make its way into Mokṣaśāstra, which is another name 
for darśana?  Add to this another question: Why such a 
professedly atheistic system as Sāṃkhya escape censure 
from the law-makers and continued to be counted among 
the six orthodox darśanas? Of course, there is one mitiga-
ting factor: Sāṃkhya never went against the inviolability 
of the Veda, since it accepted word (śabda) or verbal 
testimony as an instrument of cognition, which neither 
the Buddhists and Jains nor the Cārvākas did. The same 
applies to Mīmāṃsā, a system of philosophy that was 
thoroughly Vedic and yet atheistic. As to the other systems, 
although there is no reference to God or gods in the list of 
categories (padārthas) as in Nyāya, rebirth (pretyabhāva) 
was there (see Nyāyasūtra 1.1.9), and could therefore be 
admitted as an orthodox system. The syncretic form of 
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was avowedly theistic (see Gopikamohan 
Bhattacharya passim), as was the other syncretic system, 
Sāṃkhya-Yoga. 
Is there any relationship between the doctrine of re-
birth (involving belief in the Other World), adherence 
to the Veda, and theism? Even if we leave the second 
out, the relationship between the first and the third is 
proven by Jayanta’s categorical declaration: ‘The reply to 
(the objection against the admission of God raised by) 
the Bārhaspatyas would simply be the establishment of 
paraloka’ (NM, Āhnika 3, p. 275. C/L p. 156), that is, 
when the Other World is established, the materialists’ 
objections are automatically rejected/refuted. Such was 
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not the position of Yama in the Kaṭha Up when he, 
however reluctantly, responded to Naciketa’s questions. 
The threat of rebirth, going back to the abode of Yama 
repeatedly, is sounded first in this Upaniṣad (Kaṭha Up 
1.2.6). Whitney perceptively observed that there is no 
trace of hell in the Hindu religion of this period, ‘but to 
a repeated return to earthly existence. Transmigration, 
then, is not the fate of all, but only of the unworthy’ 
(p.92).9 Later, in the Mbh we hear of the fearsome 
nature of hell portrayed in lurid colours (12.146.18, 
cf. 12.174.5.  See Bhattacharya 2009/2011 p.46). The 
Purāṇas describe the hell in graphic details. 
Was there any special reason – political, religious, 
or economic – that Dharmaśāstra was made to intrude 
in the domain of Mokṣaśāstra? Why do the Buddhists 
and the Jains join the brahmanical writers to attack 
materialism, whether Pre-Cārvāka or Cārvāka? One 
common ground of reproaching materialism is that 
it does not admit the Other World and secondarily, 
denies the doctrine of karman. These two are the main 
planks, not only of old brahmanism and Purāṇic Hin-
duism but also of Buddhism and Jainism (irrespective 
of many differences among themselves). The reason 
why the concepts of āstikya and nāstikya were foisted 
on philosophy must have been necessitated by some dire 
need. But the need was there, and that is why a purely 
religious issue was introduced in the study of darśana, 
which had been accepted in the framework of the four 
aims in life (catur varga). If Arthaśāstra is to deal with 
wealth, Kāmaśāstra (in a restricted sense, erotics) with 
desire, Dharmaśāstra with merit, Mokṣaśāstra would 
be associated with darśana. By cultivating darśana one 
shall earn spiritual freedom and escape from the cycle 
of rebirth. However, not any kind of darśana, but only 
those that admit the Veda as the Word of Words and the 
religious law-books, Smṛti as infallible, is to be approved. 
There were two fronts in which the battle was waging: 
in one front the materialists were the common enemy 
against which the brahmanical thinkers along with the 
Jains and Buddhists had built up a united front; in the 
second front the materialists, the Buddhists and the Jains 
were arrayed against all the pro-Vedic systems. Unless the 
picture is conceived in this way the division of darśanas 
into āstika and nāstika (originally used as substantives 
but later as adjectives) remains inexplicable.
Vedicization of darsanas
The Vedicization of the darśanas was most probably 
necessitated by the desire to preserve the system of caste 
and four stages of life (Varṇa-āśrama-dharma). The powers 
that be were threatened by the advent and increase of such 
‘heretical’ communities as the Jain, the Buddhist and, last 
but not least, the materialists. The one point common 
to these three was the non-observance of caste rules and 
even denunciation of the four-fold division of the people 
into Brahmaṇas (the priest class), Kṣatriyas (the warrior 
class), Vaiśyas (the agriculturist and the trading class), and 
Śūdras (the working people). The maintenance of this 
social order was the basic need of the ruling power which 
adhered to brahmanism. The Itihāsas  (the Rāmāyāṇa and 
the Mahābhārata) and the Purāṇas (legendary accounts) 
had been utilized to preach the merits of this caste system 
apart from or rather in addition to everything else that 
made the contents of these works, censure of the here-
tics constitute the leitmotif of these legendary accounts 
purporting to glorify the new gods that had come to be 
worshipped in place of Vedic sacrificial rites, be it Viṣṇu 
or Śiva or the mother goddess (Devī). 
R.C. Hazra was no radical, yet he understood the pur-
pose behind the composition of the Purāṇas better than 
many. ‘In order to warn the people against violating the rules 
of the Varṇāśrama dharma,’ Hazra said, ‘numerous stories 
have been fabricated to show the result of violation [of the 
rules of the rites according to each caste and each state of 
being]’ (1940 pp.234-235. Emphasis added.)
The darśanas too were made to toe this line. What was 
enforced was, however, not the devotion to any god or 
goddess but to the Veda itself. By the time the philosophi-
cal systems had been given their shapes in sūtra form (the 
base text) that opened room for further commentaries and 
sub-commentaries, the demand for adherence to the Veda 
had been made and complied with. It so happen that in 
place of ṣaṭ-tarkī, the āstika /nāstika division was made to 
play a new role. Instead of the older meaning of the terms 
(affirming or denying the Other World) a new meaning 
(adherence or non-adherence to the Veda) was introduced 
and established. This interpretation, however, was current 
only in the brahmanical sphere. The Buddhists and the 
Jains continued to cling to the older meaning. However, 
that did not affect the so-called orthodox tradition. 
Thus, there was a political necessity to enforce the 
Varṇa-āśrama system. At first in north India and then, 
over time, it was transmitted to the south. 
One question, however, may appear inexplicable. 
When the Vedic rites had already become a matter of the 
past, when very few people, except the kings and rich 
citizens could afford to perform Vedic rites, why was the 
Veda projected as the ultimate authority over everything? 
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The answer lies in the fact that the Dharmaśāstras drew 
their clout from the Veda. This is why Manu does not 
forget to mention śāstra (Dharmaśāstra) along with 
śruti (2.10-11 and 12.106).10 It is not for nothing that 
Rāma is made to caution Bharata against the lokāyatika 
brāhmaṇas , who, Rāma complains, “Even though there 
are principal religious law-books, these dimwits, having 
recourse to sophistical intelligence, talk rot” (Vālmīki 
Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 94.32-33 (critical edition); 
Vulgate, 100.38-39). 
Similarly, we find a jackal in the Mahābhārata confes-
sing to Indra: ‘[In my previous birth] I was a pseudo-scho-
lar, a reasoner and a reviler of the Veda. I was addicted to 
meaningless sophistical logic (or sophistical logic without 
objects). I was the spokesman of rationalism in the as-
sembly, abused the twice-born (brahmanas), outshouted 
them and condemned brahma (Vedas) and sacrifice. I was 
a nāstika, a doubter and a fool considering myself learned. 
Oh brahmana, as a result of all this, I am (re)-born as a 
jackal’ (Śāntiparvan, 174.45-47(critical edition)). E. W. 
Hopkins (1901/1996, p. 89) refers to Anuśāsanaparvan, 
37.12-14, in which the ‘telling phrase’, tarkavidyāṃ. . 
.nirarthikām, is repeated. In fact, the same set of words, 
namely, vedanindakaḥ, ānvīkṣikī, hetuvāda, paṇḍitaka, etc., 
as occurring in the Śāntiparvan passage, is echoed in the 
three Anuśāsanaparvan verses. (This is one of the many 
instances of “self-quotation” in the Mbh).
Thus the Puruṣasūkta of the Ṛgveda (10.90, particularly 
ṛk 11), via both Dharmaśāstra and Mokṣaśāstra, provided 
sanction to the status quo ante desired by the State. As 
Kauṭilya declares: ‘The law laid down in the Trayī is benefi-
cial, as it prescribed the respective duties of the four varṇas 
and the four stages of life,’ eṣa trayīdharmaś caturnāṃ 
varṇānām āśramāṇāṃ ca svadharmasthāpanādaupakārikaḥ 
(1.3.4).
Appendix A
Major and minor lapses
The major five lapses are: 1. Killing a brahmaṇa, 2. 
Drinking intoxicating drinks, 3. Committing adultery 
with the wife of a guru (teacher) or any elder relative, 4. 
Theft of a brahmaṇa’s gold, and 5. Keeping company with 
a person guilty of these.  They are so enumerated at first 
in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 5.10.9.They are also enume-
rated in the same way in Manu 11.54. Cf. another list of 
lapses in Yāska 6.27 (for details see Moghe pp.444-448). 
An Upapātaka is generally taken to mean a secondary 
crime or minor offence, but the term has been explained 
in a different way too. Viśvarῡpa, for example, derives 
upapātaka as one ‘that may become a pātaka by constant 
addition (upanaya) or by constant practice (upetya)’ (qtd. 
Kane 4:35). In any case, such a classification of lapses as 
major and minor means little or nothing when it comes 
to nāstikya. The list of minor lapses varies from one Smṛti 
text to another but nāstikya occurs in most of them.
Endnotes
1. The doubt that troubled Naciketas – whether a human 
survives (in some form or the other) after his death – is 
resolved by Yama, the lord of the dead, who assures the 
young boy that there is such postmortem existence. 
For a detailed study see R. Bhattacharya 2016a. 
2. ‘The man who scrutinizes the record of the seers and 
the teachings of the Law by means of logical reasoning 
not inconsistent with the vedic treatise – he alone 
knows the Law, no one else.’ (Manu 12.106, Olivelles’ 
trans. Emphasis added.)
 ārṣya dharmopadeśañca vedaśāstrāvirodhinā |
 yastarkenānusandhatte sa dharmaṃ veda netaraḥ ||
3. For a bird’s-eye view of lapses enumerated in different 
Dharmaśāstra texts, see Moghe pp.444-48 and ch. 
xxxiii, pp. 670-72; for further details see Kane 4:12-
15, 32-35.
4. adṛṣṭārtha-karmābhāva buddhiḥ, ‘those who hold the 
view that karman does not produce the effect like 
adṛṣṭā’. Maṇirāma adds tāmra-lohādeḥ, ‘of copper, 
iron, and the like,’ before this phrase, thereby refe-
rring obliquely to the view mentioned and refuted 
in Nyāyasūtra 3.1.22-23. There the opponent’s view 
(pūrvapakṣa) is as follows: ‘The movement (of the 
just-born infant towards its mother’s breast) is like iron 
towards the magnet,’ i.e., no previous habit is required. 
Gautama refutes this by pointing out that nothing else 
but iron is drawn to the magnet (Gangopadhyaya, 
1982, pp.186-187). Cf. Vaiśeṣikasῡtra 5.1.15.
5. Manu 2.11, 3.150, 4.30, 11.64-65, 12.95; Yājñavalkya 
3.231, 3.236; Gautama 12.1, Viṣṇu 37.31, 
Uśanas 4.28, etc. They are also found in Vasiṣṭha-
Dharmasūtra 1.27, Baudhāyana-Dharmasūtra 2.1.60-
61, Vṛddhahārīta-Dharmasūtra 9.208-10. For other 
sources see Kane 4:12-15, 34-35. 
6. Guṇaratna was writing an elaborate commentary on 
Haribhadra’s doxographical work, Ṣaḍ-darśana- sa-
18 × Universidad de San Buenaventura, Cali - Colombia
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya
muccaya (eighth century). Haribhadra had selected 
the following six darśanas: Buddhist, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, 
Jain, Vaiśeṣika, and Jaiminīya (Mīmāṃsā). Then he 
had a second thought: since some people considered 
Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika to be a single system, the number 
of the āstikavādins would then become one less than 
six. In order to retain the total number, namely, six, 
he decided to add Lokāyata as an afterthought (verses 
78-79). But the Cārvāka/Lokāyatas were already well 
known as nāstikavādins! Haribhadra, however, used 
the word āstika in the old sense, denier of the Other 
World.
7. Cf. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.3. Perception, however, is ge-
nerally admitted to be the eldest of the pramāṇas 
(pramāṇajyeṣṭha), at least by the Nyāya school. See 
Jayanta, NM, Āhnika 2, part 1 p.164.10. 
8. It may be mentioned in this connection that although 
the English translation of Abu’l FaḌl Allami’s Ā῾in-i 
Akbarī (Vol. 3 chap.5) uses the word cārvāka in the 
section entitled Nāstika, the Persian original has 
sufistā῾ī (sophist) to denote the Cārvākas. Abu’l 
FaḌl provides synoptic views of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, 
Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Sāṃkhya and Pātañjala (Yoga), all 
āstikas, and Jain, Buddhist and Cārvāka, the nāstikas 
( Vol.3 chaps.4-5).
9. It is also worth noting that the word, naraka, the an-
tonym of svarga, heaven, does not occur even once in 
the whole of Vedic literature, except in the Jaiminīya 
Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa, 4.25,26 (EPU p.473) and the 
Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 1.19.1. Interestingly enough, in 
the former, the word is first used as neuter (svarga-
narakāṇi), as in Nirukta 1.11, but it is masculine in 
Nirukta 4.26 (mano narako vāṃ narakaḥ), etc. and 
theTaittairīya Āraṇyaka. Although it is a Brāhmaṇa, 
Limaye and Vedekar, editors of EPU, have ‘canonised’ 
the work as one of the principal Upaniaṣads, because 
it ‘fully partakes of the nature of an Upaniṣad’ (ibid., 
377).
10. ‘It is to be known that śruti is the Veda and 
Dharmaśāstra is smṛti. These two are the roots of re-
ligious merit. They are not to be called into question. 
From them religious merit shines. The twice-born who 
disregards these two roots by having recourse to logic 
should be banished by the virtuous as a nāstika and a 
reviler of the Veda.’:
 śrutis tu vedo vijñeyo dharmaśāstraṃ tu vai smṛtiḥ 
|te sarvārtheṣv amīmāṃsye tābhyāṃ dharmo hi 
nirbabhau || yo ‘vamanyeta te mūle hetuśāstrāśrayād 
dvijaḥ |sa sādhubhir bahiṣkāryo nāstiko vedanindakaḥ 
|| Manu 2.10-11
 For Manu 12.106, see n2 above. 
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